Pledgeable Collateral, Dealer Leverage, and Runs
The paper shows that strengthening collateral pledgeability can paradoxically fuel leverage and instability, confirmed by exploiting the 2005 bankruptcy reform's expansion of repo safe harbors.
Featured in No. 136 on 23 Oct 2026 · 4 days after release
- Released
- 19 Oct 2026
- First featured
- No. 136 · 23 Oct 2026
- Published in
- Not yet, as far as Semantic Scholar knows
- Fanfare
- 3 of 5
- Identifier
- RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_783
- Authors
- Husnu C. Dalgic et al.
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