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Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games Revisited

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2
Author
Daisuke Oyama Satoru Takahashi
Category
Quantitative
Date Posted
2023/03/18
Date Retrieved
2023/03/18
Date Revised
Date Written
2023/03/18
Description
We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.
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JEL Classifications
C72 D82
Keywords
Incomplete information supermodular game robustness monotone potential sequential obedience
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