Home

Timing in Dynamic Matching Markets: Theory and Evidence

Abstract Views
47
Author
Erdem Yenerdag
Category
Quantitative
Date Posted
2022/04/06
Date Retrieved
2022/05/13
Date Revised
Empty
Date Written
2022/03/27
Description
We study a two sided one-to-one matching model with two periods in which agents decide to match early and exit in the first period or to wait and search for more agents to find a match in the second period where a stable matching is implemented for those who remain in the market. The distribution of the quality of a potential match varies over time as some agents who have found mutually agreeable matches exit the market. We show that in equilibrium: (i) similar and relatively high type pairs match early (ii) the probability of matching early is a non-monotonic function of type and (iii) markets do not necessarily unravel even if each meeting is costly and agents have the option to make exploding offers. We also designed experiments with real time interactions to test our theoretical predictions and provide an extensive analysis of early matching incentives in a dynamic matching environment. In the experiments we turn on and off the possibility of matching with partners from previous pe
Downloads
4
Exports
0
JEL Classifications
C72 C78 C90 D82
Keywords
Matching incomplete information stability unraveling experiments
News Mentions
0
Pages
50
Random
164
Readers
0
Shares and Likes
0
Tweets
0
URL
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4067702
TOP